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REGULATION OF STOCK MARKET MANIPULATION
AM1ONG the earliest and most important of the legislative programs of the
Roosevelt administration was the reform of the securities markets. Support
for the reform program was derived from the widespread belief that the
market crash of 1929 was a prime cause of the ensuing depression and that
fraud, manipulation and "excessive" speculation were the basic causes of
the market crash.'
In building the new regulatory system, which was embodied in the Se-
curities Act of 1933 2 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' draftsmen
and Congressional investigators groped for a working hypothesis about the
1. "... the fact emerges with increasing clarity that the excessive and unrestrained
speculation which dominated the securities markets in recent years, has disrupted the flow
of credit, dislocated industry and trade, impeded the flow of interstate commerce, and
brought in its train social consequences inimical to the public welfare." SEN. RP. No. 1455,
73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934); see Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H. 1?. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (testimony of J. M. Landis).
2. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §§ 77a-77aa (1940).
3. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §§ 78a-78jj (1940), referred to hereafter as the Act
or the 1934 Act and cited by section number only.
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nature and effects of trading in securities. 4 Speculation was contrasted un-
favorably with investment. It was somehow felt that the purchase of securi-
ties for the expected change in their capital value was a less productive form
of financial activity than the purchase of securities for dividends or interest
payments. Yet economic theory accepted specialized risk-bearing as a useful
and necessary function, and speculation was regarded as a productive force
which shifted funds from the less to the more profitable areas and tended to
harmonize money rates.' Thus the organized market served its expected
function of guiding the flow of capital funds to their most productive uses.
It was understood that the American securities markets were unique in
the breadth of the public's participation,6 in the violence of their reactions,
and in the extent to which they were regarded as a symbol of business activ-
ity. The difficulty with the functioning of the American markets, the eco-
nomic observers agreed, was not speculation as such but the fact that the
speculators were regularly stampeded into panicky fits of irrational optimism
or pessimism, and that they were prone to prefer respectable conformity to
independent judgment.7 Thus the inquiry into speculation as such was in-
conclusive. Whether the securities market caused the instability of the rest
of the economy was not apparent. Even if it was conceded that market
crashes disrupted the mechanism of finance, it was not at all clear that we
could have a stable securities market in an unstable economy, and no theo-
rist of the securities markets went so far as to contend that speculation in
stocks was alone the cause of industrial fluctuations. The draftsmen lost
interest in the search for a formula which would eliminate speculation and
permit only long-term investment.
Yet the prejudice against speculation left traces in the new system for the
4. See generally Hearings, note 1 supra; Hearings before Committee on Banking and
Currency on Senate Resolutions 84 (72d Cong.) and 56 and 97 (73d Cong.), 72d Cong. and 73d
Cong. (1932 and 1933) (the famous Senate investigation). On the connection between tile
market crash and general economic activity see KEYNEs, T E GENERAL THEORY Or EM-
rLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936) 150-9; ANGELL, INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS
CYCLES (1941) 126, n. 1; SIMPSON, THE MARGIN TRADER (1938) 132-4.
5. Most theories of speculation were derived from the classical economic doctrines of
the free market. Hardy, Recent Developments in the Theory of Speculation (1937) 27 AM.
EcoN. REv. (Supp.) 263; Ross, SPECULATION, STOCK PRICES AND INDUSTRIAL FLUCTUA-
TIONS (1939) c. 11. For a recent discussion of the proper place of speculation in a price-
regulated economy see LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL (1944) c. 8. Generally it has
been said that the function of speculation is to maintain market price at a reasonable equiva-
lent to investment value or intrinsic value. Alternatively, it is sometimes said that mainte-
nance of stability of market price is a function of speculation. These are not necessarily
parallel functions; they may conflict. See Ross, supra, at 189.
&. See Worcester, Foreign and American Stock Exchanges (1937) 8 AMx. L. ScHooL
REv. 1058.
7. See KEYNES, loc. cit. supra note 4; GRANAM AND DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1934)
11; Address 6f David Saperstein, former Director of the Trading and Exchange Division of
the S.E.C. in (1937) 8 Am. L. SCHOOL REV. 1066; Symposium, Business, Speculation and
Money (1929) 13 AcAD. OF POL. Sc. PRoc. No. 4.
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control of the securities markets, particularly in the provisions for the con-
trol of margin trading and short selling. It is also to be found in the dis-
crimination in the federal income tax law against short-term security trans-
actions in favor of long-term holding.8 But control of speculation was not
to be the central theme of the legislation. Much of the force which might
have been directed at speculation itself was spent on the so-called "abuses"
of the markets. Fraud in the sale of securities and manipulation in the mar-
kets were the twin objects of this drive. It was thought that if the abuses
could be corrected, speculation as a whole could successfully perform the
functions assigned to it by the classical economic theory.
Although the 1929 crash and the resulting investigations thus provided
the impetus for the reform program, many of the details of the securities
laws which resulted borrowed heavily from the background of the common
law. This is particularly true with respect to the provisions aimed at fraudu-
lent practices; to a large extent it can be said that the elimination of fraud
-was the purpose of the legislation. But at the same time there can be found
a broader purpose-the regulation of activity which in some way conflicts
-with public interests other than protection against fraud. Although some
precedent for the latter objective is to be found in the earlier law, particu-
larly in the law of restraint of trade as applied to corners, it is largely a re-
flection of the later drive against speculation as a whole.
A complete survey of the influence of the reform program on the markets
-would include such topics as the credit controls,10 investment banking prac-
tices," the full disclosure requirements and market manipulation. Recent
developments in the markets have posed numerous questions about the
efficacy of the regulatory system. In this comment it is proposed to single
out for examination only one phase of the program-the control of manipu-
lation. A judgment that the problem of manipulation has been successfully
8. Gains from the sale of securities held for less than six months are taxed in full; gains
after a holding of more than six months are taxed at a maximum effective rate of 25%.
INT. REv. CODE § 117 (1946).
9. See infra note 40.
10. Responsibility for the control of credit used for security speculation is lodged in
the Federal Reserve Board. Sections 7,8 of the Act. For a recent discussion of the controls
see Judson and Emerson, The Effect of Regulation on Cash Transactions in Securities (1946)
44 MicH. L. REv. 997. Effective January 21, 1946, the Federal Reserve Board forbade
margin purchasing. This action has been attacked as unauthorized by the law, on the theory
that the power to raise margin requirements was granted in order to prevent the diverrion
of credit from other uses to speculation, while the Board's action was taken at a time when
there was no indication that ample credit was not available for all purposes. See Address by
Emil Schram, President of the New York Stock Exchange, before the St. Louis, Mis souri,
Chamber of Commerce, April 12, 1946, in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, April 18,
1946, pp. 2069, 2101; N. Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1946, § 2, p. 49, cols. 4, 5 (remarks by Senator
Bridges of New Hampshire). Effective February 1, 1947, the Board reduced margin re-
quirements to 75%. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1947, § 1, p. 1, cols. 2,3.
11. See Comment (1946) 56 YALrE L. J. 333.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
met will suggest that further reforms should be-directed at other problems.12
The first section describes the more common types of manipulation that
were employed prior to 1934; the remaining sections discuss the common
law doctrine with regard to market manipulation, the controls provided by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the impact of the statutory con-
trols on organized exchanges and the over-the-counter market.
METHODS OF MANIPULATION
Market manipulation 13 refers to widely varying types of devices used to
stimulate or to discourage the buying and selling of securities. The ready
transferability of stocks and bonds makes the securities markets highly sus-
ceptible to such activities.
Information, true or false, complete or incomplete, is the basis for the
individual judgments which lead investors or speculators to buy, sell or
hold securities. Consequently publicity has been one of the most commonly
employed manipulative techniques. One of the earliest forms was the
spreading of false rumors about political or economic affairs, 14 or the affairs
of a single security issuer, 5 leading the public to form erroneous judgments
and take market action. Word of mouth rumor-mongering was augmented
by the use of fake financial services, tip sheets, bribed financial writers,
10
and bribed customers' men or brokers who, without disclosing their financial
interests, would recommend certain securities. Successful manipulation by
publicity techniques was not limited to rumors which were false. If a manip-
ulation by other means than publicity were planned, its success could be
promoted by the spreading of advance notice among persons anxious to get
in on the ground floor.17
In a highly liquid securities market, however, the most successful form
of publicity may be the appearance of the market itself, the published record
of the volume of trading and prices. The simplest way to assure a desired
market appearance, aside from outright falsification of the records, is for
12. Previous investigations into the subject of speculation have, to a large extent,
centered on the problem of manipulation. See Report of Governor Hughes' Committee on
Speculation in Securities and Commodities, June 7, 1909; Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Banking and Currency on House Resolutions 429 and 504, 62nd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1912) (Pujo "Money Trust" Investigation); Hearings before Committee on Banking
and Currency on S. 3895, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); Senate investigation, supra note 4.
13. For more complete descriptions of the details of manipulative devices than that
here attempted see Mathias, Manipulative Practices and the Securities Exchange Act (1936)
3 U. oF PIr. L. REv. 7, 104; Moore and Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchango
Act (1934) 2 U. oF CH. L. REv. 46; Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Ex-
change Act (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 624.
14. See Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. R. 536 (K. B. 1814) (spreading
of false rumors about Napoleon's death). See note 42 infra for the background on this case.
15. See People v. Goslin, 67 App. Div. 16, 73 N. Y. S. 520 (1st Dep't 1901).
16. See Ridgely v. Keene, 134 App. Div. 647, 119 N.Y. S. 451 (2d Dep't 1909).
17. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS (1935) 478.
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the manipulators to enter both buy and sell orders for the same security
at the same price, thus producing a recorded transaction in the market indis-
tinguishable by external appearances from a normal transaction executed
by independent buyers and sellers. Where one party is at both ends of the
transaction, it is called a wash sale. If confederates cross-trade between
themselves, it is known as the matched order. The wash sale and matched
order have been largely phenomena of organized exchanges because the
availability of brokerage services for the entry and quick execution of the
orders, and the widespread dissemination by ticker and newspaper services
of the reports of transactions, increase the effectiveness of the techniqueh
Wash sales and matched orders are methods of insuring that an appear-
ance of market activity or a price is created or maintained. Such insurance
may be unnecessary, however. For instance, the mere placing of a bid for a
security in the market conveys to observers the impression that there is
interest in that security; the contrary impression will be created by the
placing of an offer to sell. If, then, a member of the public decides to buy
or sell and enters an order which meets the standing bid or offer, an executed
transaction results which will contribute as much to the appearance of the
market as a wash sale or a matched order. If one person or a group engages
in a sustained amount of buying or selling in a given security, the result vill
be an appearance of active trading and a price, the level of which will depend
upon the number of shares of the security in the hands of holders responsive
to market appearances or ready to engage in trading for any reason. These
results obtain, whatever is the purpose of the buying or selling by the in-
dividual or group. It may be to acquire, liquidate or shift an investment.
It may be a speculative move, because of the belief that the market price
will change due to factors other than the immediate effect of the speculative
buying or selling by the individual or group. If, however, it is to produce
or maintain a market appearance of trading activity or a price change by
the effect of the immediate buying or selling, it may be described as manip-
ulation by actual purchases and sales, whatever the further purpose of the
manipulation is.'
The primary use of manipulation by actual purchases and sales is to pro-
duce an increased market price. It may be that a block of stock is to be dis-
tributed, and the distributors desire to obtain a better price for the stock
than the existing market price. If the distributors go into the market and
18. The effectiveness of wash sales and matched orders depends on public reporting of
them. See Berle, Liabilityfor Stock Market Manipulation (1931) 31 COL. L. Rv. 264,270-1.
19. This species of manipulation is not always so broadly defined. It is frequently said
that only "bad" manipulation, meaning bull or bear raiding or comparable activity to
change the market price is really manipulation. See Daley, Secondary Market Death Sen-
tence (June 10, 1938) 8 INVESTMENT BANKING 194. It seems of greater analytical value,
however, to class together all buying and selling which has as its immediate purpose an
effect on the appearance of the market, saving the distinctions for the more remote ends in-
volved. Compare TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND INC., THE SECURITY MAREETS (1935) 444.
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buy up those amounts of the security currently being offered, an increased
market price may result. The effectiveness will depend upon how much of
the stock is brought onto the market by holders ready to sell at a small in-
crease in price. The numbers of these potential sellers may be reduced tem-
porarily by withholding agreements exacted from the holders of large blocks
and by the use of other types of stimulation, such as publicity, to induce
bther persons to buy more rather than to sell what they have. When the
total effect of this activity has produced the desired increase in market
price, the distribution will begin.20
The second most important use of manipulation by actual purchases and
sales is to peg or stabilize the market price. When the distribution begins,
whether the distribution price has been raised by manipulation or not, it
will be in the interest of the distributors to maintain that price on the market
throughout the course of the distribution. The market price may be subject
to depression from a number of causes. Speculators or investors who have
changed their minds may dump on the market the stocks which they bought
in the direct distribution. Market conditions as a whole may become un-
favorable. Buyers who would normally absorb sales in the open market may
transfer their interest to the shares being distributed. If the distribution
itself is taking place on the open market, perhaps on an organized exchange,
these effects will be augmented by the weight of the selling pressure of the
distribution itself. To counteract these effects the distributors support the
market price by entering bids and by purchasing in the over-the-counter
market or on the exchange to absorb whatever selling pressure is encoun-
tered. 1
The converse of purchasing to raise the market price is selling to depress
it. A well-timed number of sell orders, if sufficient in volume to overcome
buying pressure, may succeed in driving the market price of a security down
to a point at which it can be bought back at a profit. If the original sales
were of securities actually owned by the seller, the total profit will depend
upon the price at which they were originally purchased. It is possible, how-
ever, to sell securities not currently owned, through the medium of the
short sale. The short sale may take two forms. It may be a sale for future
delivery, or it may be a sale for present delivery, the seller borrowing stocks
from some other holder in order to make the delivery. The seller must later
purchase other shares in order to repay his lender. The latter form is pre-
dominantly used in this country. If sales made to drive down the market
price are short sales, the total profit will be the difference between the selling
price and the price of the covering purchase. The fact that the volume of
20. More complete expositions of the use of this technique by pools, syndicates, joint
accounts and individuals may be found in SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2nd Ses's, (1934)
36-48; Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 624; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., Tun SE-
CURITY MARKETS (1935) 456-99.
21. The best brief discussion of stabilization is in Securities Exchange Act Release No
2446, Mar. 18, 1940.
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selling which may be created is limited only by the amount of stock available
for lending and not by the personal holdings of the manipulator makes the
short sale more advantageous than the long sale in a manipulation to depress
the market price.
2 2
An activity, allied to stabilization, which involves manipulation by
actual purchases and sales, is that of market "sponsorship." There are two
general situations in which sponsorship is practiced. At the close of the
period of distribution of a security, when it is relatively unseasoned and un-
digested by the market, the price may be subject to great instability due to
the resale of large amounts of the security by speculators and a relatively
light demand to absorb the pressure because of the unknown qualities of
the issue. At that point the principal underwriter who participated in the
distribution may wish to make a market by purchasing insofar as necessary
to maintain or stabilize the market price, reselling from his inventory as the
opportunity appears. Market sponsorship, in a broader sense, is generally
practiced, particularly in the over-the-counter markets, with respect to the
lesser-known securities in which the volume of trading by non-professionals
is too light to furnish any kind of a continuous market. For each of such
securities there may be one or more dealers who are ready either to buy or
sell at any time, thus furnishing a continuous market for the security. Such
a dealer, who makes a market in a particular security, may exercise great
control over the volume of trading and the market price by varying the
ratio of his buying volume to his selling volume. If he conceives it desirable
in his own interest or in the interest of the issuer or others, he may be able
to maintain the market price of the security or to raise it or depress it.2
Another activity of the same order is that of supporting the market against
sudden breaks and panics. If this is done by a single dealer in a sponsored
security, it may be no more than a further extension of the sponsorship
device. If, however, the panic is such as to engulf the whole market, support-
ing activity may extend farther than sponsored stocks. In such a case, on
an organized exchange, the officials may encourage the pooling of capital for
the purpose of bidding in any or all securities to check or slow the declining
prices. Perhaps the most notable example of this activity was the banker's
pool in 1929.24 A more recent example was the support buying done by
members of the New York Stock Exchange in utility stocks when a large
volume of selling broke out following the decision of the Supreme Court in
Ashwander v. T. V. A. upholding the constitutionality of the T. V. A.2-
From this brief summary of the general types of manipulation it can be
seen that two chief problems present themselves. First, as to each type of
22. See SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 3d Sess. (1934) 50-3; WnINEY A%'D PEnMINs,
SHORT SELLING FOR AND AGAINST (1932) 156.
23. TwEzrmNTH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS (1935) 267.
24. Id. at 459.
25. SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF TIE COMIPLETE SEGREGA-
TION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER (1936) 24.
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manipulation, there must be a judgment made as to its effects on individual
persons and on the operation of the market. Little difficulty is encountered
here in condemning outright such devices as false publicity, bribes, wash
sales and matched orders. As will be developed more fully, however, the
evaluation of manipulation by purchases and sales is not so easy. Second,
effective techniques of prevention or regulation must be developed. Here
again, the problem is greatest with respect to manipulation by purchases
and sales.
CONTROLS BEFORE 1934
in the analysis of controls of manipulative activity which developed prior
to the Securities'Exchange Act of 1934 two phases should be distinguished:
first, the growth of a legal doctrine that only partially matched the range of
activities involved; and second, the growth of enforcement techniques
which proved completely inadequate.
The legal approach to the problem of market manipulation was primarily
through the concept of fraud. This was, perhaps, inevitable since the be-
ginnings were made in times when public participation in security trading
was negligible.2 Legal remedies were usually called into play only when
invoked by an individual who thought he had been cheated, or when the
manipulators fell out and went to court to settle their differences. Wash
sales and matched orders early came to be regarded as "fictitious" trans-
actions, used to misrepresent the actual state of the market.Y Organized
exchanges forbade their members to use them. 2 Eventually, they formed a
basis for criminal indictments for conspiracy to defraud.0 False rumors de-
signed to unsettle security prices have long been condemned, largely because
of their use to defraud." The touting of stocks through fake financial serv-
ices, bribed financial writers, and the bribing of brokers and customers'
men 1 likewise were classed as fraudulent practices. Courts might refuse to
enforce contracts based on such services, and injunctions were used against
their enforcement.
3 2
The reach of strict fraud doctrine was, however, far too short. The damage
to a person who bought a worthless stock in reliance on the apparent activ-
ity created by wash sales might be regarded as too remote a consequence of
the manipulative activity, or the wash sale might not be regarded as a repre-
26. 1 MYERS, TEE NEW YORK MONEY MARKET (1931) 296.
27. Report of Governor Hughes' Committee on Speculation in Securities and Commodities,
June 7, 1909, p. 7.
28. WARSHOW, UNDERSTANDING TnE NEW STocK MARKET (1934) 5.
29. United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F. (2d) 321
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
30. Rexv. De Berenger, 3 M. &S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. R. 536 (K. B. 1814).
31. United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
32. Ridgely v. Keene, 134 App. Div. 647, 119 N.Y. S.451 (2d Dep't 1909); Stevens v.
Wallace, 106 N. J. Eq. 352, 150 Atl. 835 (1930).
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sentation on which anyone had a right to reIy.3 The fraud concept largely
failed to reach manipulation by actual purchases and sales. The single
strong expression of legal opinion against it was in the English case of Scott v.
Brown.34 There the court on the ground of public policy refused to aid a
party to a contract having as its object the purchase on the market of the
shares of a new corporation in order to raise the market price and induce the
public to subscribe. By way of dictum, the court declared that this would be
ground for a civil action for damages and a criminal indictment for con-
spiracy to defraud. Yet a few years later the same court was willing to en-
force a contract by which a jobber on the London Stock Exchange made a
market in a stock in order to control its price while a pool was engaged in
distributing a block of it.35 In the United States prior to 1934 no case es-
tablished the illegality of 'any form of manipulation by actual purchases and
sales, although United States v. Brown G has been widely cited as establish-
ing such a rule.-"
The inadequacies of common law fraud doctrine were bolstered to some
extent by statutory expressions of a broader concept of fraud. New York
passed laws against wash sales, matched orders and the use of rumors de-
signed to unsettle security prices.3 s The mall fraud statute was brought into
use in appropriate cases. 9 Here again, however, the scope was too limited
to reach manipulation by actual purchases and sales.
Although the fraud concept was the chief reliance in the early law of manip-
ulation, the development of an alternative approach based on the public
33. McGlynn v. Seymour, 14 Daly 420 (N.Y. 1888).
34. 2 Q. B. D. (1892) 724.
35. Sanderson & Levi v. British Westralian Mines & Shares Corp. Ltd., 43 SoL. J. 45
(K. B. 1898).
36. 5 F. Supp. 81 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
37. See Berle, Stock farket. fanipulation (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 393, 397. The author,
relying largely on United States v. Brown and Harris v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 771 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931), states "... Wash sales, matured orders, artificial activity, pegging operations,
and mere false representations to the market, all constituted fraud and deceit, which would
presumably give rise to a civil action ...injunction under an appropriate statute, or to
criminal action under appropriate state or federal laws." However, the limited grounds
upon which the appellate court affirmed the trial court in United States v. Brorwn hardly
justify such a broad statement as to "artificial activity" and "pegging operations," despite
the trial judge's extensive review and professed approval of the supposed English rule. See
United States v. Brown, 79 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). Harris v. United States likewise
rested primarily on practices such as wash sales, falsified trading reports and direct misrepre-
sentations to purchasers. The only other two common law American cases to bring directly
in issue manipulation by actual purchases and sales, Harper v. Crenshaw, 82 F. (2d) 845
(App. D. C. 1936), and Bigelow v. Oglesby, 302 Ill. App. 27, 23 N. E. (2d) 378 (1939) were
decided after 1934 on grounds of public policy, and, although the Act did not apply, the
public policy as there expressed must have had weight in the decisions.
38. The Martin Act, New York General Business Law, Art. 23-A. See People v. Rice,
221 App. Div. 443, 223 N. Y. S. 566 (1st Dep't 1927).
39. United States v. Brown, S F. Supp. 81 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); Harris v. United States,
48 F. (2d) 771 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
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interest in a free market could be detected. For instance, a market in which
there are no sellers is not a free market, and the deliberate creation of such a
situation by cornering all the available supply of a stock has been held to be
in restraint of trade.4° Contracts having such a corner as their object would
not be enforced by the courts,41 and exchange authorities in such a situation
might suspend normal trading and order the settlement of outstanding con-
tracts at a fixed price in order to break the jam. Yet combinations to achieve
less than the complete domination of the market implicit in a corner were
singularly free from restraint.
42
Overshadowing the shortcomings of the legal doctrine developed to meet
market manipulation was the failure of the legal remedies to measure up to
the job of actual control. Crises in the securities markets were frequently
followed by investigations to determine the causes. The Pujo committee,
Governor Hughes' committee, and the Senate Banking and Currency com-
mittee, 43 each at different periods of time, found that manipulation had not
been effectively outlawed. Although wash sales and matched orders were
regarded as fraudulent, examples of civil liability based on them were almost
non-existent. Even in England, where manipulation by actual purchases
and sales was said to be banned, the court in Scott v. Brown admitted it was
every-day practice,44 and in neither country could a case of criminal or civil
liability be found based on the practice.
CONTROL UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
Tim STATUTE
The law of market manipulation under the Act may be contrasted with
the common law both in terms of legal doctrine and the machinery of en-
40. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525 (1913); but see Albers Comm. Co. v. Spencer,
205 Mo. 105, 103 S. W. 523 (1907). Compare BERLE AND MEANS, Tun MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) 295-6.
41. Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145 (1869). But see Barry v. Croskey 2 J. & H. 1,
70 Eng. Rep. R. 945 (Chancery 1861); Salaman v. Warner (and others), 64 L. T. R. (N. S.)
598 (Q. B. 1891), af'd, 65 L. T. R. (N. S.) 132 (C. A. 1891).
42. The early English statutory crimes of regrating (buying goods in market and re-
selling them in or near the same market), forestalling (buying up goods before they reach
the market and spreading false rumors about the market), and engrossing (cornering the
supply) furnish interesting analogies to the common law of market manipulation, and it is
possible to trace their influence into such decisions as Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67,
105 Eng. Rep. R. 536 (K. B. 1814) (false rumors) and those involving corners. But the
analogies are weakened by the fact that these crimes were statutory attempts to protect the
royal grant of monopoly privileges and were repealed before the nineteenth century. See
Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 34, 38-9 (". . . it seems
doubtful whether the ancient law respecting engrossing, forestalling and regrating has made
much of a contribution to present legal concepts of monopoly . . ."); HANDLVR, CASES AND
OTHER MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1937) 28-33; OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE
REGULATION (1936) 10-1.
43. See note 12, supra.
44. Scott v. Brown, 2 Q. B. D. 724, 729 (1892).
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forcement. Although it has been stated that the primary contribution of
the Act was in its development of an adequate enforcement agency to police
the markets, and that the law to be enforced was merely codified,45 it is
more accurate to say that there was a definite progression from the earlier
law in both respects.
Legal doctrine. The Act accelerated the expansion of the concept of fraud
to take within its scope all the various techniques of manipulation. This is
most clearly exemplified by the rule, now well established, that the failure
to disclose that the price at which a security is bought or sold is affected by
manipulative activity of any kind is a misrepresentation by ornitting to
state a material fact.46 This doctrine is not explicitly stated in the Act.
It is rather an interpretation of those sections, which forbid or regulate
manipulation, to mean that such activity is a material fact. Being a material
fact, it must be disclosed under the Securities Act of 1933.
Some of the specific provisions dealing with manipulation in themselves
display their origin in the law of fraud. Section 9, which applies to exchange
trading, declares unlawful wash sales and matched orders if effected "for
the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in
any security .. . or a false or misleading appearance with respect to the
market for any such security... ." 4 This phraseology treats the wash
sale and matched order as a form of misrepresentation; it is an expanded
concept of fraud, however, since there need be no showing of damage to
anyone. Section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful "to effect, alone or with one or
more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered on a
national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading in
such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the pur-
pose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others." This pro-
vision is aimed directly at manipulation by actual purchases and sales. Vith
respect to those cases in which actual purchases and sales are used in the
same manner that wash sales and matched orders are used-to misrepresent
the state of the market-Section 9(a)(2) is only a logical progression from
the common law; it is still within an expanded fraud theory. Whether the
scope of the section is actually so limited will be discussed below.
45. Berle, supra, note 37, at 399.
46. S. E. C.v. Otis & Co., 106 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939); In the Matter of Rursell
Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S. E. C. 332 (1941). The same principle is enforced by the Commis-
sion by forcing disclosure in registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 of se-
curities to be offered "at the market" when the market has been or is being affected by "arti-
ficial" influences. Richard Ramore Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 377 (1937); Canusa Gold
Mines, Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 548 (1937); Old Diamond Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 786 (1937):
Potrero Sugar Co., 5 S. E. C. 982 (1939); Reiter Foster Oil Corp., 6 S. E. C. 1028, 1048-51
(1940).
47. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a (1940), the substance of which has been incor-
porated by regulation in the 1934 Act. See Rules X-10B-5 and X-15C1-2, Rules and Regu-
lations under the Securities Exchange Act. (Hereafter all rules and regulations under the
1934 Act will be cited by number only.)
48. Section 9(a)(1).
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Section 9(a)(4) forbids "false or misleading" statements with regard to
material facts in inducing the purchase or sale of a registered security-
clearly an embodiment of the fraud concept. Section 10(b) forbids the use
in connection with the purchase or sale of registered or unregistered securities
of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention
of Commission rules. Section 15(c)(1) forbids brokers or dealers to effect a
transaction in or to induce the purchase or sale of a security over the counter
by means of "any manipulatie, deceptive or other fraudulent device or
contrivance," as defined by the Commission. Thus, Section 10(b) applies
to all securities, whether traded in an organized exchange or over the counter
by any person; Section 15(c) (1) applies only to transactions over the counter
by brokers and dealers. The detailed specification of illegal activities by
Commission definitions under these two sections has been primarily directed
to erecting a fraud standard of conduct. For instance, it has been made
illegal to stimulate exchange trading in a security, which is currently being
distributed, by bribing brokers or customers' men to solicit purchases on
the exchange;49 this rule is to meet one device for using the market itself as
an indirect representation of value to prospective purchasers in the distribu-
tion.
A view of the Act as designed to protect public interests beyond the sup-
pression of fraud contributed to shaping its anti-manipulative provisions.
Section 9(a) (2), which includes a fraud standard, at least as a minimum,
has broader implications. By contrast with the wash sale and matched order
section, which proscribes those devices only if intended to mislead, manipula-
tion by actual purchases and sales is banned if intended to induce others to
buy or sell the security. The Commission has found that this makes room
for condemning activities which fall short of "actual fraud." 0
Sections 9(a)(3) and (5) forbid the use of tips of impending manipulated
price changes to induce purchases or sales of securities. The policy of in-
sulating the public from incentives to excessive speculation 51 is the primary
aim here, rather than protection of purchasers and sellers from fraud. Sec-
tion 9(a)(6) subjects to Commission regulation manipulation by actual
purchases and sales for the purpose of "pegging, fixing, or stabilizing" the
price of registered securities. As will be discussed below, this must be re-
garded as an exception to the blanket condemnation of Section 9(a)(2), an
exception based on the supposed public interest in the stabilization device
49. Rule X-10B-2.
50. In the Matter of White & Weld, 3 S. E. C. 466, 513 (1938). See Herlands, Criminal
Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934) 21 VA. L. R. 139, 156.
S1. The theory that the public must be protected against its own reckless proclivities
has been a recurring one in the securities market literature. The Hughes Committee felt that
"a real distinction exists" between speculation by "persons of means and experience" and
that by the uninformed general public. Report of Governor Hughes' Committee on Specula-
tion in Securities and Commodities, June 7, 1909, p. 4. In his message to Congress recom-
mending securities exchange legislation President Roosevelt echoed the theme. SEN. R P.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also SimPsoN, TnE MARGIN TRADER (1938) 132-4.
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in aid of security distributions. Short selling, while within the scope of Sec-
tion 9(a)(2) governing manipulation by actual purchases and sales, was
made subject to Commission regulation by a separate section. 2 Behind the
anti-manipulative provisions as a whole was the conviction that manipula-
tion bred excessive speculation and unstable security prices which, irre-
spective of fraud, injured the public by unsettling the credit cycle and inter-
fering with the proper performance of the market function in valuing securi-
ties. 53 Thus, there have been a variety of policy considerations which have
led to broader treatment than would have been attempted within the more
limited confines of the fraud theory.
Enforcement machinery. The Act bridged the gap between legal theory
and actual practice by providing the Commission with broad powers of in-
vestigation in order to detect manipulation and a wide variety of remedies
with which to proceed. In the utilization of these powers, the professed
purpose of the Commission has been to detect manipulation at its inception
and prevent it, rather than to apply the statutory remedies after the damage
has been done. Necessarily, therefore, much of the enforcement activity
consists of informal investigations, personal consultations, and the answering
of detailed questions propounded to the Commission concerning its inter-
pretation of the law.5 4 The base upon which all of the enforcement activity
rests is the system of market watching which the Commission maintains.
The data on trading in large numbers of securities are studied for unex-
plained variations, which may then be investigated. 55
If remedial action becomes necessary, a wide choice of remedies is offered.
The administrative remedies have been the most important Where mem-
bers of organized securities exchanges are involved, proceedings to suspend
or expel them from membership may be instituted.cs In the case of brokers
or dealers doing business in interstate commerce, their registrations with the
Commission may be revoked5 Finally, proceedings to suspend or expel
members of the National Association of Security Dealers may be used
against brokers or dealers holding membership in that organization.Ps Each
of these is a penalty of great severity. Damage to reputation is perhaps the
most serious consequence. Loss of stock exchange membership is the loss of
trading advantages as broker, dealer, or personal trader.
There have been only two expulsions from national exchanges for manipu-
lative activity;59 the lighter penalty of suspension has been inflicted in four
52. Section 10 of the Act; see SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sers. (1934) 50-5.
53. See § 2 of the Act.
54. Purcell, The Structure and Functions of the Securities and Fxrhange Comssior.
(1945) 6 FED. BAR. ASS'N J. 241, 252.
55. S.E.C. Ami. REP. (1944) 64--5.
56. Section 19(a)(3).
57. Section 15(b).
58. Section 15 A(1)(2).
59. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588 (1937); In the Matter of Wright, 3 S. E. C.
190 (1938).
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cases.60 The National Association of Security Dealers is the broker-dealer
association organized and registered under the Maloney Act for the semi-
private regulation of the over-the-counter securities market. 1 Member-
ship, estimated at about 90% of the country's brokers and dealers, confers
an economic advantage in that members may grant each other price conces-
sions which they may not grant non-members. 2 Membership is not, how-
ever, a prerequisite to doing business. There have been no expulsions from
the N.A.S.D. for manipulative activity; there have been three cases resulting
in suspensions.6" Broker-dealer registration with the Commission is a pre-
requisite to doing an interstate securities business. 4 Revocation of this
license is, therefore, tantamount to a ban on doing business. Only one case
of such revocation has occurred for manipulative activity," although in one
case voluntary withdrawal of registration was allowed where a violation was
found.6 In administering these remedies the Commission has exercised con-
siderable latitude in adjusting the penalty to the seriousness of the offense.
Thus, where it was found that the suspension of a Commission rule might
have deceived the violator into a misconception of the state of the law, the
lighter penalty of suspension from the N.A.S.D. was employed rather than
expulsion.7
Under Section 21(e) the Commission may bring an action in the federal
courts for a temporary or permanent injunction "whenever it shall appear
to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to engage" in any
prohibited activity. An early restrictive interpretation of this section re-
quired that the defendants be engaged in the illegal activity at the time the
Commission filed the bill, or be about to engage in such activity at that
time.63 Since the institution of an investigation by the Commission is a
60. In the Matter of White & Weld, 3 S. E. C. 466 (1938); In the Matter of Richards,
4 S. E. C. 742 (1939); In the Matter of Merrill, 8 S. E. C. 620 (1941); In the Matter of Kidder
Peabody & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3673, Apr. 13, 1945.
61. Comment (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 633.
62. See Rules of Fair Practice of National Association of Security Dealers, Inc., July 15,
1939, Section 25.
63. In the Matter of Barrett & Co., 9 S. E. C. 319 (1941); In the Matter of Masland,
Fernon & Anderson, 9 S. E. C. 338 (1941); In the Matter of Kidder Peabody & Co., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 3673, Apr. 13, 1945.
64. Section 15(a).
65. In the Matter of M. S. Wien & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3855,
Sept. 17, 1946.
66. In the Matter of Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S. E. C. 332 (1941).
67. In the Matter of Barrett & Co., 9 S. E. C. 319 (1941); In the Matter of Masland,
Fernon & Anderson, 9 S. E. C. 338 (1941). Another administrative control available to the
Commission, under authority given by Section 19(a)(4), is to suspend trading in a registered
security for ten days if in the Commission's opinion the public interes't so requires. It was
under this section that trading was suspended in the common stock of Kresge Department
Stores, Inc., when it made an unexplained rise from 1YS to 7Y2 at a time when the company
was in dissolution and the maximum liquidating value of each share was two dollars. See
N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1946, p. 19, cols. 6, 7.
68. S. E. C. v. Torr, 87 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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necessary condition precedent to bringing such an action, thus effectively
warning the manipulators to desist for a time, this interpretation threatened
to rob the injunctive remedy of its value. A more liberal reading by another
court, however, required only that the defendants be engaged or about to
engage in the illegal activity at the institution of the Commission's investi-
gation. 9 Nevertheless, the potentiality of other restrictive decisions has
led the Commission to suggest that the section be amended to grant the
right to an injunction whenever the manipulator "has engaged" in the pro-
hibited acts." There is only one published instance in which the Commission
has won a temporary injunction under Section 21(e), and the injunction was
dissolved on appeal.7 '
The most drastic weapon in the Commission's arsenal is criminal prosecu-
tion for wilful violations, a sanction which has been very rarely employed.
2
Although criminal prosecutions are in form brought by the Attorney General,
the evidence on which to base a prosecution is furnished by the Commission
with its recommendation for prosecution. 3 In the case of illegal manipula-
tions a common alternative to criminal action under the 1934 Act has been a
criminal proceeding under the Securities Act of 1933, alleging the omission
to state a material fact by concealing manipulative activity from security
purchasers in violation of Section 17(a)(2) of that Act.
7 4
69. Otis & Co. v. S. E. C., 106 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
70. This suggestion was adopted as the recommendation of both the Commision and
the security industry representatives in the joint conference which preceded the 1942 hear-
ings on proposed amendments to the Securities Acts. See Report on the Conferences with
the S. E. C. and its Staff on Proposals for Amending the Securities Act of 1933 and the S_-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 by the Representatives of IBA, NASD ,NYCE, and NYSE,
July 30, 1941, at 285. This joint study of proposed amendments to the securities laws has
recently been resumed. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1947, § 2, p. 19, cols. 6, 7.
71. Temporary injunction granted, S. E. C. v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315 (S. D. N.Y. 1936);
dissolved on appeal, 87 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); permanent injunction entered (on
showing that the manipulators "were engaged" in the illegal acts when the Commison
filed the bill), 22 F. Supp. 602 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). Temporary injunctions were denied in
S. E. C. v. Andrews, 1 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 265 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); S. E. C. v. Saphier, 1 S. E. C.
Jud. Dec. 291 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); cf. S. E. C. v. Bennett, 62 F. Supp. 609 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
72. Section 32. Only one case of criminal prosecution under the 1934 Act for manipula-
tion has been officially reported. United States v. Alinuse, 114 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940);
same case, 142 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). There have been other cases, however, in the
United States District Courts, the opinions of which were unreported. See Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 2410, Feb. 15, 1940 (manipulators pleaded guilty in case of B. G.
Sandwich Shops, Inc.).
73. Section 21(e).
74. Another theoretical means of enforcement is civil liability for manipulative activity
based on Section 9(e), although to date the provisions have never been successfully invoked.
The immense task of assembling the evidence necessary for proof of a manipulation case is
beyond the competence of most private parties. A statutory basis for civil liability based on
manipulation of unregistered securities [Section 9(e) is limited to registered securities) has
been found in Section 29(b), as amended in 1938, but it has added nothing to the enforce-
ment of the Act. See Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S. D. N. Y. 1941);
compare Rosenberg v. Hano, 26 F. Supp. 160 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
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THE ORGANIZED EXCHANGES
The statutory basis for the control of manipulation in exchange trading is
Section 9. In the administration of this section the problems encountered
with respect to Subsections (1), (3), (4), and (5) have been relatively minor.
The prohibition of wash sales and matched orders in Subsection (1) is the
most important of this group, and the chief difficulty encountered has been
that of establishing the necessary element of illegal purposeYl Even before
the Act, wash sales and matched orders were avoided by sophisticated manip-
ulators in favor of more refined devices."6 The more difficult questions have
arisen with respect to the interpretation of the ban on manipulation by
actual purchases and sales contained in Section 9(a) (2), the implied legaliza-
tion of stabilization in Section 9(a)(6), and the regulation of short selling.
The diversification of treatment accorded these three problems discloses
that the job of the Commission here involves far more than the mere nega-
tive prevention of fraud. Within the scope of Section 9(a)(2) there has been
a development of a body of doctrine for distinguishing patterns of illegal
activity; stabilization has been sanctioned within limits as serving the public
interest despite possibilities of abuse; and short selling has been seriously
restricted irrespective of its manipulative aspects.
Interpretation of Section p(a) (2).
"To effect, alone or with one or more other persons a series of transactions in
any security registered on a national securities exchange." When a person
initiates a buy or sell order which results in an executed transaction, he has
"effected" a transaction in that security. If a number of persons initiate
such transactions pursuant to a common plan, each would be said to have
"effected" his transactions "with one or more other persons." Restricted to
such scope, however, the reach of Section 9(a)(2) would be too short. Of
necessity, the interpretation has been broad. For instance, it has been held
that transactions effected by friends,77 relatives,7 business associates, 9 em-
ployees, O persons acting on tips and rumors traceable to the manipulators,
81
persons acting upon the advice of persons bribed by the manipulators, " as
well as transactions initiated by the manipulators themselves in the name of
75. Wash sales and matched orders ". . For the purpose of creating a false or mis-
leading appearance of active trading . . . or a false or misleading appearance with regpect
to the market . . ." for a security are illegal. See In the Matter of White & Weld, 3 S. E. C.
466,510 (1938).
76. TWENTiETn CENTURY FUND, INc., THE SECURITY MARKETS (1935) 471.
77. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588, 605 (1937).
78. Ibid.
79. In the Matter of Merrill, 8 S. E. C. 620 (1941).
80. In the Matter of Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S. E. C. 332 (1941).
81. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588, 618 (1937).
82. S. E. C. v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); R. J. Koeppe & Co. v. S. E. C.,
95 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
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discretionary accounts,8 may be within the scope of the phrase. The chief
problem under such a broad interpretation is a factual one. Is the purchasing
done by persons acting on the advice of another broker who has recently
talked to the manipulator properly attributable to the manipulator? 8 4
The term "series" has been interpreted to mean two or more transactions.
Thus, where three actual purchases were all that were executed in the course
of what was found to be a manipulation, they constituted a series of transac-
tions.8 5 In any manipulation of any consequence there is no difficulty in
isolating more than one transaction in order to find a series. This is particu-
larly true in view of the Commission's interpretation that "transactions"
means unexecuted bids and offers as well as executed purchases and sales.P
This is a ruling of necessity in view of the recognized price effect of unexe-
cuted bids and offers in the market.
Only dealings in securities registered under the Act are directly within the
scope of Section 9, but the effect of the Section is somewhat more extensive.
Unregistered securities which are admitted to unlisted trading privileges on
national exchanges are treated as registered securities and are therefore sub-
ject to Section 9 7 In addition, the Commission has by rule extended the
scope of Section 9 to any securities which are exempted from the registration
provisions of the Act pursuant to an order which specifically declares them
subject to this rule."' Furthermore, it is immaterial whether a manipulation
in any of the above securities takes place on an exchange or over-the-counter;
in either case Section 9 applies.6
"Creating actual or apparent active trading in such security." The determi-
nation whether a particular pattern of new trading has created actual or
apparent active trading is a function of the prior state of the market in the
security, the number of shares actively traded, and the general level of mar-
ket activity as well as of the particular trading attributable to the alleged
manipulator. Therefore, generalization as to how much trading is active
trading is impossible. In the Meeian case, over a period of ten days, 15,400
out of a total of 40,900 purchases were attributed to Meehan directly, in
addition to which considerable activity by specialists, stimulated by Mee-
han's trading, was considered as part of the active trading created.P In the
Wright case 79% of the purchasing in the manipulated stock on one day of
trading constituted the illegal activity.9" The trading which will be con-
83. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588 (1937); In the Matter of Wright, 3 S. E. C.
190 (1938).
84. See In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588, 619-20 (1937).
85. In the Matter of Kidder Peabody & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No.




89. In the Matter of Wright, 3 S. E. C. 190, 213 (1938).
90. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588, 616 (1937).
91. In the Matter of Wright, 3 S. E. C. 190, 195 (1938).
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sidered as created by a series of transactions is, first, the series of trans-
actions itself and, second, whatever trading by outsiders may be considered
as induced by or drawn in by the appearance of the market, as was the
trading by specialists mentioned above in the Meehan case. In the Kidder-
Peabody case the placing of a market bid for twenty-five bonds following a
nine-day period in which the largest block traded consisted of three bonds
was said to create an "impression of sudden active interest in the bonds." 92
This was followed by evidence that an outside trader, influenced by the large
bid, entered a purchase order for eleven bonds, believing that he would be
iinable to get them at a lower price due to the presence of a strong bidder in
the market. His trading was considered to be created by the series of manip-
ulative transactions 3
It should be noted that in the statute, "creating actual or apparent active
trading" as an element of liability is alternative to raising or depressing the
price. Nevertheless, there have been no published cases since the passage of
the Act in which both the creation of active trading and a price change have
not been present.
"Or raising or depressing the price of such security." The amount of price
change is immaterial. It is necessary only to show that the series of transac-
tions effected by the manipulators contributed to the price change. An un-
guarded implication in an opinion of the General Counsel of the Commis-
sion that a "substantial" change in price only would be illegal was quicldy
negatived when asserted as a defense to a manipulation charge. 4 Price
changes of only fractions of a point have been sufficient to make a case.06
Many of the manipulation cases since 1934 have involved low price stocks,
in connection with which a very small point variation may be very large
when expressed in percentage terms. In no published cases since the passage
of the Act have there been manipulations to depress security prices.
"For the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others."
The main inquiry in all manipulation cases has been toward establishing the
purpose for which the more easily proved trading activity was undertaken.
The problem may be divided into two parts. First, there may be established
an intent to induce others to purchase a security in some way. This is fre-
quently undisputed, and independent proof is usually not difficult. Second,
it must be shown that the trading activity engaged in by the alleged manipu-
lator was intended to assist in inducing purchasers to buy from him. Thus,
where a dealer in railroad bonds executed a series of market purchases which
raised the market price of an issue, some of which he was concurrently selling
to other dealers on a wholesale basis, there was ample proof of tle trading
92. In the Matter of Kidder Peabody & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3673,
April 3, 1945, p. 12.
93. Id. at 13.
94. In the Matter of Russell Maguire & Co,, Inc., 10S. E. C. 332,347 n. 22 (1941).
95. In the Matter of Kidder Peabody & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
3673, April 3, 1945. (49% to 50Y4).
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activity and of an intent to induce the purchase of bonds by others, but the
Commission concluded that there was insufficient proof of a purposive rela-
tion between the two. Where an underwriter, who was to market a forth-
coming issue of stock at a price related to the market price of stock of the
same class outstanding, in a period of one hour purchased 3,800 shares of the
outstanding stock on the exchange and raised the market price, a preliminary
injunction was denied because the court was not convinced that the purchas-
ing was for the purpose of promoting the later distribution.97
Purpose must always be inferred. The manner in which the market trading
is conducted may furnish the inference. Such things as frequently executing
the opening and closing transactions of the day, "reaching" for the stock,
and the entry of unduly large orders may disclose the intent to affect the
market in a manner which is only consistent with a purpose to induce pur-
chasing by others.93 Usually, however, there must be resort to supplemen-
tary facts constituting the setting in which the manipulation is carried on.
The fact that the parties have an option on a block of stock which will only
prove profitable if the market price is induced to rise, ' the ownership of a
block of stock purchased at a price which may only be recouped in a rising
market,' the use of other types of stimulation, such as publicity, 0 1 pay-
ments to brokers or customers' men for touting,1 2 efforts to induce the issuer
to put out favorable news or to declare a dividend,ma efforts to disguise the
origin of buying pressure by the use of. dummy or discretionary accounts "
are a few of the facts from which the inference has been drawn that the pur-
pose was to induce purchasing by others.
Stabilization. No aspect of the control of manipulation under the Act has
furnished more theoretical and practical difficulties than drawing the line
between illegal manipulation under Section 9(a) (2) and permissible stabiliza-
tion under Section 9(a)(6). Stabilization during a distribution is generally
indistinguishable from any other kind of manipulation by purchases and
sales as far as the statutory elements of illegality are concerned. If Section
9(a) (6) had not been included in the Act, stabilization would have been out-
lawed.105
96. In the Matter of Strasburger & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3494,
Oct. 16, 1943.
97. S. E. C. v. Bennett, 62 F. Supp. 609 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
98. R. J. Koeppe & Co. v. S. E. C., 95 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938); In the Matter
of Wright, 3 S. E. C. 190, 198 (1938).
99. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588 (1937); In the Matter of Wright, 3 S. E. C.
190 (1938); United States v. Minuse, 114 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
100. In the Matter of Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S. E. C. 332 (1941).
101. United States v. Minuse, 114 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
102. S.E.C.v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S. D. N.Y. 1938); R. J. Ioeppe & Co. v.S. E. C.,
95 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
103. In the Matter of Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S. E. C. 332,343, n. 18 (1941).
104. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588 (1937); In the Matter of Wright, 3 S. E. C.
190 (1938).
105. Since stabilization is used in aid of the distribution of securities it seems that ther
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Until 1938 the Commission adopted no rules regulating the practice of
stabilization. Delimitation of its scope was accomplished by decisions under
Section 9(a)(2), in which the defense was raised that the alleged manipula-
tion was really stabilization,0 s and by published opinions of the General
Counsel of the Commission.1et Then the Commission came forward with a
statement of policy on the subject of stabilization, recognizing that it is a
form of manipulation, evaluating the conflicting considerations involved,
and concluding that the public interest in the maintenance of the flow of
capital to industry required the continuation of fixed price underwriting
contracts and stabilization."0 $ A broad program of regulation was announced,
beginning with the limited and somewhat different problem of stabilization
of securities issued "at the market." "I Further regulations covering fixed
price distributions have not been forthcoming, however.
The difficulty in generalizing about the validity of stabilization activities
is attested to by the fact that opinions of the Commission's General Counsel
on the subject are always couched in terms of specific fact situations, not in
general terms. Nevertheless, certain propositions seem fairly well estab-
lished. First, before, during and after a primary or secondary distribution it
is permissible to enter the market with bids, purchases or sales in order to
stabilize the market price provided that the amount of such trading is not
greater than that necessary to peg the price,"' the price does not rise due to
the stabilization trading,"' and all persons to whom the stabilizers sell se-
curities in the distribution are informed of the stabilization,"' Second, the
price which is stabilized must have been an independently established one.
is implicit in the concept, beyond the immediate purpose of "pegging, fixing, or stabilizing
the price," as it is described in Section 9(a) (b), the further purpose of "inducing the purchase
or sale of such security by others," as it is described in Section 9(a)(2). See Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 3505, Nov. 16, 1943. The substance of many of the attacks on Sec-
tion 9 and its administration has been that the line has (1) been so vaguely drawn as to
curtail legitimate activities because of feared illegality, and (2) been so tightly drawn as to
include too much within the ban of Section 9(a)(2). For specific formulation of these criti-
cisms see Wall Street Journal, March 14-17, 1939 [amendment to section 9(a)(2) proposed
by representatives of national security exchanges; reply by then-chairman of the Commils-
sion William 0. Douglas]; Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H. R. 4344, H. R. 5065, and H. R. 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 69, 1359, 1407,
1409-12, 1444-56 [Amendments to Sections 9(a)(2) and 9(a)(b) in the Wadsworth bill,
H. R. 4344].
106. This defense has been used in virtually all Section 9(a)(2) cases, See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 2446, March 18, 1940, p. 20.
107. See the following Securities Exchangd Act Releases: No. 605, April 17, 1936; No.
3056, Oct. 27, 1941; No. 3505, Nov. 16, 1943; No. 3506, Nov. 16, 1943.
108. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2446, March 18, 1940.
109. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2363, Jan. 3, 1940.
110. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3505, Nov. 16, 1943.
111. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3506, Nov. 16, 1943.
112. The prospectus must contain notification that stabilization is contemplated. Se-
curities Act Release No. 1890, Feb. 9, 1939. Where stabilization takes place in an exchange,
notice is generally put on the ticker when stabilization commences and ceases.
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If at the commencement of stabilization the market price still reflects the
effect of a prior manipulation, the stabilizing transactions will also be illegal
manipulation."13 Third, during the course of the distribution any trading in
the'market done by any members of the distribution group will be considered
as part of the stabilization and must not be excessive in amount for that
purpose and must not raise the price.
11 4
Short Selling. Allegations of widespread manipulations to depress ex-
change prices through the medium of short selling in the period after the 1929
crash were the proximate cause of the initial post-1929 investigations of the
exchanges." 5 The emphasis, however, was less on short selling as a manipu-
lative device than it was on its ethical implications and economic effects.
Any individual short sale has the same economic effect as a long sale.
There will, of course, be the added later effect of the covering purchase. The
total effect of short selling depends upon the volume and timing of the sales
and covering purchases. The volume of short sales is expansible due to the
fact that stocks available for lending may be borrowed more than once over
a period of time. Critics of short selling point to this expansible feature of
short selling as one danger inherent in the device. The timing of short sales
and covering purchases is the basis, however, for the sharpest divergence
between the proponents and opponents of short selling. Proponents say it is
a source of stability for the market in that short selling while the market is
rising serves to dampen the rise, and that subsequent covering purchases
serve to check the ensuing decline, if there is one."' Opponents say that
short selling predominantly increases after the market has commenced falling
and thus intensifies the drop, and that covering purchases either do not come
in time to help check the fall or else their cushioning effect does not remedy
the damage already done by the short selling. 17 As is to be expected, the
evidence for each point of view is incomplete and frequently conflicting,"5
113. In the Matter of Meehan, 2 S. E. C. 588 (1937); In the Matter of White & Weld,
3 S. E. C. 466 (1938).
114. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3505, Nov. 16, 1943. Certain more technical
rules apply to stabilization also. If the issue is registered under the Securities Act of 1933,
daily reports of stabilization trading must be sent to the Commission. Rule X-17A-2. If
the offering is registered under the 1934 Act and priced "at the market," notice of intention
to stabilize must be sent to the Commission and to the exchange on which the security
is principally traded, and the price at which stabilization purchases may be made is so
regulated as to permit only cushioning and not rigidly pegging the price. See Regulation
X-9A6-1.
115. Hearings before the Committee on fix Judiciary on Short Selling, 73d Cong., 1st S-es.
(1932); Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Cvrrency on S. .Res. 84, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932). No actual bear pools were uncovered. TwENraETI1 CENTURY FUo, Ixc.,
THE SECURITY M!UMETS (1935) 504.
116. See Hearings before Comnmittee on Banking and Currency, supra, note 115, at 187-98.
117. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1548, Jan. 24, 1938.
118. The defense of short-selling conducted by Richard WNhitney, former President of
the New York Stock Exchange, during the Senate investigation was complicated by the
lack of exact figures on the volume and timing of short selling. See Hearings before Corn-
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although it may be doubted whether short selling has any long-term effect
in depressing market levels.
After an initial period of regulation under rules promulgated by the na-
tional exchanges, the Commission decided further restrictions were neces-
sary. The decision was made after a study of short selling during the 1937
market break, which tended to show that short selling accentuated the de-
cline, particularly in market leaders. A rule was therefore formulated which
strictly limited short selling even on stable or rising markets and virtually
prevented it on a decline."' This rule was later changed to loosen the re-
strictions on stable or rising markets but to retain a strict limitation when
prices are declining.
20
The importance of short selling as a manipulative device today is negligi-
ble. Although Section 9(a) (2) was written to cover manipulation of security
prices down as well as up, no cases have arisen since the passage of the Act
involving manipulation to depress the market price.
TiE OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET
The distinctions between the control of manipulation in the over-the-
counter market and on organized exchanges spring mainly from the differ-
ences in the markets themselves. An organized exchange centers buying and
selling of a security in a single market with physical facilities for quick execu-
tion of orders and widespread publicity for the price and size of each trans-
action. In the over-the-counter market trading is dispersed into a large
number of separate markets and there is less widespread publicity given the
facts of each transaction. Short selling is no problem here. But market
sponsorship is of much greater importance in the over-the-counter field than
it is on organized exchanges.
121
The control of manipulation in the over-the-counter markets is primarily
based on Sections 10(b) and 15(c)(1) dealing with "manipulative or decep-
tive" and "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent" devices and con-
milttee on Banking and Currency, supra note 115, at 113. Figures are now published regularly
by the New York Stock Exchange on the volume of short interest at intervals of time, but
for a thorough understanding of the effect of short selling it is necessary to study day-to-day
changes in individual issues, as was done by the Commission preparatory to the adoption of
-Commission rules on short selling in 1938. Compare Ross, SPECULATION, STOCK PICES
AND INDUSTRIAL FLUCTUATIONS (1938) 139 with MEEKER, SHORT SELLING (1932) 139.
119. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1548, Jan. 24, 1938.
120. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2039, March 10, 1939. The amended rule
allows short sales at the same price as the last preceding long sale price provided such last
preceding long sale price was higher than the last different price which preceded it. The
effect is to bar short selling of any issue the price of which is dropping except during rallies.
A further restriction on short selling is contained in Section 16(c) which forbids short selling
of a corporation's stocks by officers, directors, or principal stockholders,
121. For a recent discussion of the over-the-counter market and the legal controls of
other practices than manipulation see Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Countcr Brokers
and Dealers in Securities (1946) 59 HARv. L. R. 1237.
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trivances. By definition and interpretation the Commission has expressed
its belief that encompassed within these sections are grants of power suffi-
cient to extend to over-the-counter securities the same protection as is
afforded securities subject to Section 9.122 In 1935 this viewpoint was crys-
talfized in a rule 123 which declared unlawful any act or omission to act in
connection with the purchase or sale of an unregistered security, which
would violate Section 9 if done with respect to a registered security. How-
ever, the Commission quickly suspended the effectiveness of the rule insofar
as it applied to over-the-counter securities because of protest from the indus-
try. It was contended that Section 9(a)(2) in its present form was designed
for the problems of exchange trading and was not suited to over-the-counter
problems.12 4 Successive postponements of effectiveness were eventually fol-
lowed by cancellation.125 The Commission, however, continued to maintain
that the substantive law was unchanged by the cancellation, that transac-
tions in unregistered securities which would be violations of Section 9(a)(2)
if in registered securities are equally illegal under Sections 10(b) and 15(c)(1),
and that such transactions were in fact illegal at common law. 'J
Insofar as this viewpoint regards the provisions of the Act regulating
manipulation by purchases and sales as codifications of the common law,
it rests upon an insecure basis. 1 1 In view, however, of the statutory author-
ity of the Commission to proscribe by definition those activities which vio-
late Sections 10(b) and 15(c)(1) there is no reason to believe that the com-
mon law is a determining factor in the substantive law under the Act.
The more difficult question is how far the law which has been developed in
the setting of exchange trading should be applied to the over-the-counter
field. In the first two cases which involved over-the-counter manipulation,
broker-dealers were suspended from the N.A.S.D. for manipulating the
price of stocks, blocks of which they were in the course of distributing.
1 3
In each case the dealer, who was quoting the stock in the National Quota-
tion Service and newspapers, edged up his bids and actually purchased stock
on a rising price scale, thus effectively raising the market price preparatory
to a public distribution of the same stock. This conduct the Commission
held to be the equivalent of a series of transactions raising the market price
of registered securities to induce the purchase of such securities by others,
122. See In the Matter of Barrett & Co., 9 S. E. C. 319, 328 (1941). On the control of
manipulation in over-the-counter markets generally see Andreson, Mansprdation of Orer-
th-Counter Securities Markets (1942) 10 GEo. WAsm L. REv. 639.
123. Rule GB4, later renumbered Rule X-10B-4. Securities Exchange Act Releases
No. 1680, April 29, 1938, and No. 1887, Oct. 1, 1938.
124. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1689, May 3, 1938.
125. Securities Exchange Act Releases No. 2904, May 23, 1941.
126. In the Matter of Barrett & Co., 9 S. E. C. 319, 328 (1941).
127. See note 37 supra.
128. In the Matter of Barrett & Co., 9 S. E. C. 319 (1941); In the Matter of Mastland,
Fernon and Anderson, 9 S. E. C. 338 (1941).
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which would violate Section 9(a) (2), and hence also violated Section 15(c) (1).
The failure to disclose to purchasers that the market price was so affected
was also a violation of Section 15(c)(1).12
In view of the distinctions between exchange trading and over-the-counter
trading, the application of the principles developed under Section 9(a)(2) to
over-the-counter trading is a matter of great difficulty for lack of a depend-
able standard against which to measure the suspect activity. For instance,
in determining whether the activities of an over-the-counter dealer have
created active trading in a security or raised the price of the security, the
standard may be a volume of trading activity and a price which only the
dealer himself has previously maintained. It seems that a far more adequate
basis of liability under many circumstances will be the failure to disclose to
purchasers that the trading activity and the currently quoted price have
been on an increasing scale, the second ground for the Commission's deci-
sion. Nevertheless, the opinion in the second case specifically grounded the
decision on both a fraud and a public interest theory of manipulation. 130 It
seems, therefore, that the standards of exchange trading are to be applied
wherever there is what may be described as an independent market.'3 '
The impact of these legal controls on the over-the-counter market is
chiefly in the direction of curtailing the scope of market sponsorship. In a
broad sense the whole structure of over-the-counter trading is built upon
the practice of market sponsorship. Insofar as an issue may be actively
traded by several independent dealers, it departs from the status of a spon-
sored issue, but when it develops an active independent market it will nor-
mally be listed on an exchange. It is here that some of the heaviest criticisms
have been leveled at the Commission's interpretation of the Act. It has been
said that the restriction of sponsorship has resulted in the underpricing of
outstanding issues resulting in a direct injury to present holders and in an
indirect injury to the issuer in that future financing is hampered.
3 2
The actual restriction on the activity of a sponsor is real enough. He is
forced to take a position in a security and maintain it. If he allows the price
to drop for a time and then commences purchasing which raises the market
price again, he will be unable to sell any of his accumulated inventory until
he has remained out of the market long enough for the price to readjust itself
129. See Rule X-15c 1-2 (b).
130. In the Matter of Masland, Fernon and Anderson. 9 S. E. C. 338, 344 (1941) (",
the anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act are directed not only
against the defrauding of unwary investors but with equal force against the impediments to
a free and open market created by artificial stimulants or restraints.")
131. See In the Matter of M. S. Wien& Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3855,
Sept. 17, 1946. Compare In the Matter of Norris and Hirschberg, Inc., Securities and Ex-
change Act Release No. 3776, Jan. 24, 1946 (no independent market found).
132. See letter by L. H. Spalding in 8 INVESTMENT BANKING 249-50 (1938); Daly, Sec-
ondary Market Death Sentence (1938) 8 INVESTMENT BANKING 194-6 [criticisms directed pri-
marily to the impact of Section 9(a)(2) on sponsorship of lesser-known, exchange-traded
issues, but applicable to the over-the-counter market also.]
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to supply and demand originating from others; if he sells at a price which is
still affected by his owri trading activity, his action is open to the interpreta-
tion that his purpose was to induce purchasing by others.
133
CONCLUSIoN
The history of the legal controls of manipulation before 1934 indicates
clearly that the reforms embodied in the Act were long overdue. The crea-
tion of an enforcing agency was probably the most significant step taken,
although important advances were made in the substantive law to be en-
forced. By proceeding with relative caution, case by case, the Commission
has achieved a maximum of effective regulation with a minimum of actual
enforcement proceedings, despite the fact that difficult problems were en-
countered in the interpretation of such provisions as the ban on manipula-
tion by actual purchases and sales, qualified as it was by the implied legaliza-
tion of stabilization. The absence of large scale manipulation cases in recent
years, particularly on organized exchanges, leads to the conclusion that com-
pliance with the rules has become easier and virtually complete. The lack of
such cases further suggests that manipulation played little or no part in
stimulating the 1945-46 securities bull market. Nor is there reason to believe
that it has played any significant role in the recent declines.3 4 The short
selling rules, which seriously limit all short selling while prices are dropping,
seem adequate to control the lesser problem of manipulation by short selling.
These conclusions indicate that future analyses of the operation of the se-
curities markets may focus upon the more fundamental problem of the
proper function of speculation itself, undiverted by the problem of the mar-
ket "abuse" of manipulation.
133. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3056, Oct. 27, 1941.
134. But see statement by Representative Sabbath of Illinois and reply by James J.
Caffrey, Chairman of the S. E. C., on the September market decline. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8,
1946, § 1, p. 1, col. 1; The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Sept. 19, 1946, p. 1456,
cols. 4, 5. Representative Sabbath suspected that the decline had been engineered by short
sellers for political purposes; Chairman Caffrey doubted that short selling was responsible.
